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Murphy: Murphy: Environmental Law

Comment
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NEW LEGAL CONCEPTS
IN THE ANTIPOLLUTION FIGHT
I. INTRODUcriON

What do you do when a municipality decides that the highest
and best use of a mighty river is an open sewer? What do you do

when the Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation
decides to drown the Grand Canyon or most of Central Alaska, or
insists upon destroying the delicate ecological balance of an entire
state like Florida?
Just what can you do?
SUE THE BASTARDSI
We must knock on the door of the courthouses of this nation
and seek equitable protection for our environment.... Industries
and government can ignore your protests, ignore your picket signs,
and certainly they can repress your demonstrations. But no one
in industry or government ignores that scrap of legal cap that

begins:
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED TO ANSWER THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ANNEXED HERETO WITHIN TWENTY DAYS OR JUDGMENT WILL BE
TAKEN AGAINST YOU FOR THE RELIEF DEMANDED.
Victor Yannaconel

Until quite recently it has been the accepted view that one of man's
chief functions was to control and to exploit his environment. Only within
the last year have most Americans begun to realize that we do not possess
an inexhaustible supply of natural resources; that in fact the quality of
man's life is threatened and perhaps his very existence.
This public concern for the quality of our environment is beginning
to be felt in the courtroom. Private citizens have attempted to preserve
the livability of this country by bringing legal action against the federal
government, the states, and private industry as well as the state and federal
administrative agencies which are supposed to be protecting the environment. There are dozens of suits pending in federal and state courts involving
environmental or pollution issues. 2 These cases present a great diversity of
1. Sue The Bastards, speech delivered on "Earth Day" at Michigan State
University, April 22, 1970.
2. Sklar v. Park Dist. of Highland Park, No. 69HI64 (Cir. Ct. 19th Jud.
Cir., Lake County, Ill., filed Aug. 11, 1969) (water pollution); Sierra Club v. Minn.
Pollution Control Agency, No. 662,008 (Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Sept. 19,
1969) (water pollution); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.,
Civil No. 1694 (D. Mont., filed Nov. 13, 1968) (air pollution).
Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969);
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legal theories ranging from constitutional claims to a pollution-free environment to more conventional theories such as nuisance or trespass. The
whole area of environmental law is quite new and sometimes confusing
because lawyers and courts have not yet settled on any one best legal
theory that will accomplish the goal of protecting the environment. This
comment is an attempt to bring together these diverse theories and to explain some of the legal concepts in this developing area of environmental
law.

The first part of this article will deal with the structure of the common
law doctrines of nuisance, trespass and riparian rights and their adaptability
to the control of pollution. In recent years there has been a sharp decline
in the number of common law decisions reported in the environmental
field. Nevertheless, an understanding of the common law is vital because it
forms the basis of statutory regulation. While the state and federal regulatory agencies now have the dominant role in managing our environment,
the common law supplements this body of statutory law. Secondly, this
comment will consider procedural difficulties (primarily the standing
requirement) encountered by private litigants trying to participate in the
administrative process. Lastly, there will be a discussion of new theories
for creating substantive rights in environmental quality.
II. THm TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES: COMMON LAW NUISANCE,
TRiEsPASS AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS

A. Private Nuisance
Nuisance law has traditionally been divided into areas characterized as
"public nuisance" and "private nuisance." The common law of private
nuisance prohibits the unreasonable use of property so as to substantially
interfere with the use and enjoyment of another's property.3 A specific example of a private nuisance case would be a situation where a factory in emitting caustic chemicals, dust or fumes which damage neighborhood crops and
interfere with the use and enjoyment of that land. In such cases, the plainParker v. United States, Civil No. C-1368 (D. Colo., filed Jan. 7, 1969) (challenging the Forest Service about use of public land).
Weingand v. Hickel, Civil No. 69-1317-EC (S.D. Cal., filed July 10, 1969)
(questioning the Secretary of the Interior about regulation of federal offshore
oil leases).
Kelly v. Kennedy, Civil No. 69-812-G (D. Mass., filed July 29, 1969) (airport extensions); Abbot v. Osborn, No. 1465 (Super. Ct., Dukes County, Mass.,
filed March 28, 1969).
Citizens Comm. for Hudson v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D. N.Y. 1969);
Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. McCabe, No. 2872/68 (Sup. Ct., Rockland
County, N.Y., filed Oct. 1, 1968) (highway locations).
Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969) (destruction of parklands).
Ottinger v. Pennsylvania Cent. Co., No. 68 Civil 2638 (S.D. N.Y., filed June
28, 1969) (oil dumping). These actions are cited in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. liv.
473 (1970).
3. 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 222 (1932); see generally 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 2 (1942); 10 Auz. L. Rv. 107 (1968).
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tiff's remedy is often restricted to money damages. However, if the plaintiff
can show that he meets certain requirements for the exercise of equity jurisdiction, the court, using its equity powers, will enjoin the nuisance. 4
Jurisdiction of equity to issue an injunction against a polluter depends
upon such factors as whether the nuisance is continuous or merely temporary, whether the activity threatens permanent or irreparable injury
to life or property, and the adequacy of the remedy at law. 5 Further, the
defenses customarily available in suits for equitable relief such as laches,
unclean hands, balancing of equities or conveniences are available in such
nuisance suits.(
Until recently, the few antipollution suits that had been brought were
all common law actions for nuisance. While at first glance a private nuisance
suit by an individual against a polluter to recover his damages with the
possibility of an injunction would appear to provide an adequate means
of pollution control, the obstacles to the plaintiff's recovery are actually
quite formidable. To obtain relief from a nuisance a plaintiff must have
suffered material harm or substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of his property2 Usually no private action can be maintained for water
pollution that kills fish in the rivers, or air pollution that kills birds or
wildlife. 8 Thus, even though serious pollution exists thereby creating a
nuisance, a private individual can not bring the action because he can not
show special personal damages. 9
Further, courts apply a reasonable use test to the defendant's use of his
land to determine whether there has been a nuisance. Certain amounts of
pollution are tolerated as a reasonable use of one's property. Unreasonableness of the nuisance is a question of fact that is left to a jury.10 In addition,
the plaintiff must prove that his injury was a result of the defendant's
pollution. With hundreds of industrial establishments, utility companies,
and private citizens pouring pollutants into the air or water, this is often an
impossible task. In most cases the pollution that kills our environment is
a cumulative result of all these various discharges and there is therefore no
way of pinning down a particular polluter.
4. See Griffith v. Newman, 217 Ga. 553, 123 S.E.2d 723 (1962); Pendaley v,
Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963); see also 21 STAN. L. REv. 293
(1969).
5. See H. MCCLINTOCX, HANDBOOK ON EgurrY (1948). The history of nuisance
law is set forth in L. STREL-r, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 212-13 (1906);
Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAmB. L.J. 189 (1947); McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. Rav. 27 (1948).
6. See de Funiak, Requisites for Equitable Protection Against Torts, 37
Ky. L.J. 29 (1948); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 90, at 621-23 (3d ed. 1964); Hines, Nor
Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IowA L. Rv. 186
(1966).
7. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 88, at 598 (3d ed. 1964).
8. Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476 (1918); New Orleans v. Lenfant,
126 La. 445, 52 So. 575 (1910); Riggins v. District Ct., 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645

(1935).
9. Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160
Or. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939); Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942).
10. W. PROSSER, TORTS

§ 36, at 206 (3d ed. 1964).
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Probably the greatest obstacle to the effectiveness of the private remedy
as a pollution control device is the court's continued tendency to balance
the equities or conveniences. 1 The court may recognize that the defendant's
polluting activities have caused the plaintiff's injury, yet the court will
"balance the equities," which means that it weighs the damage done to
the plaintiff against the damage that would be sustained by the polluter
were he forced to cease his activities. A classic example of a court "balancing
the equities or conveniences" occurred in the recent New York case of
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.' 2 The plaintiff landowners brought an
action seeking an injunction to restrain a cement company from emitting
dust and raw materials, a situation created by excessive blasting in operating
its plant. The trial judge denied the equitable remedy of injunction although operation of the defendant's plant did create dust and vibration
nuisance. An injunction was not issued and the plaintiffs were confined to
their legal remedies. The reason given by the court was that the
[d]efendant expended more than $40,000,000 in the erection of one
of the largest and most modem cement plants in the world. The
company installed at great expense the most efficient devices available to prevent the discharge of dust and polluted air into the
atmosphere.' 3
Although the court found that there was a nuisance and that the plaintiffs'
land was reduced in value from $346,000 to $161,000 as a result of plant
operations, the pollution was allowed to continue thereby depriving the
neighbors of the use of their property. The trial court stated:
[I]f the protection of a legal right even would do a plaintiff but
comparatively little good and would produce great public or
private hardship, equity will withhold its discreet and beneficient
hand and remit the plaintiff to his legal right and remedies.' 4
On appeal the property owners lost 15 with the appeals court finding that
balancing the equities was a proper way to try a nuisance case,' 6 that the
company used modem and efficient pollution devices in an unsuccessful
attempt to prevent discharges, and that zoning was consistent with the use
11. However, some states have rejected the balance of convenience doctrine
in water pollution cases. See Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co.,
58 F. 970, 57 F. 1000 (C.C.D. Ind. 1893); Barrington Hills Country Club v. Village
of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191 N.E. 239 (1934); Parker v. American Woolen Co.,
195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 208
N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1918); Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 803, 58 N.E. 142
(1900); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 852, 199 N.W. 390
(1924).
12. 55 Misc. 2d 1028, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div.

2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dept. 1968) See Roberts, The Right to a Decent
Environment; E=MC2:Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their
Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. Rlv. 674 (1970).
13. 55 Misc. 2d at 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
14. Id. at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
15. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968).
16. See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment, E=MC2 : Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. R.v. 674
(1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss1/8
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by the cement company."' Therefore, by paying the property owners fair
compensation for their land a private company was able to seize private
property and lay waste to the neighborhood.18
When they engage in balancing the equities, courts put on one side
of the scale loss of jobs, loss of revenue to the community, loss of taxes
to the city or state, and how much the polluter has spent in his unsuccessful
attempt to curb pollution. On the other side of the scale the losses to "one"
property owner are weighed. Some environmentalists have suggested that
the courts are not weighing all the relevant factors and that the solution is
to broaden the list of those factors to include "injury to society."' 9
On occassion courts have refused to balance the equities and have
found in favor of the plaintiff property owner, despite the fact that such
relief results in a far greater economic loss to the community in general. The
case of Hulbert v. California Portland Cement C0. 2 0 is an example
of a case where the court refused to balance the equities. The court there
stated:
Of course great interests should not be overthrown on trifling or
frivolous grounds, as where the maxim de minimis non curat lex is
applicable; but every substantial, material right 2 1of person or
property is entitled to protection against the world.
However, in most courts the balancing of equities is by22 far the more
prevalent practice, especially where an injunction is sought.
17. See Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance
Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440; 16 S'A~cusE L. REv. 860 (1965).
18. Lester, Nuisance-As a "Taking of Property", 17 U. MIAMr L. REV. 537
(1963). Clearly in Boomer there is an element of inverse condemnation. However,
it is worth noting that there are differences in application of the comparative
convenience doctrine between cases which grant damages (like Boomer) and
cases which deny relief altogether. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886). There appears to be a difference in application of the
comparative convenience doctrine for purposes of determining (1) whether relief
should be granted, and (2) what is appropriate relief. The same kind of balancing
technique may be used, but the weighing of the various factors may be quite different for the two purposes.
19. This discussion of balancing the equities is not an assertion that in all
cases the doctrine is an unacceptable judicial method of determining whether an
interest deserves protection. However, it is an assertion that the courts must
weigh environmental factors when they engage in balancing. One author suggests
that courts reject comparative convenience when it wishes to find for the plaintiff,
and accepts comparative convenience when it favors the defendant. (See P. Davis,
to be published Wis. L. REv. Summer 1971).
20. 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
21. 161 Cal. at 251, 118 P. at 933. See Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private
Nuisance, 3 NAT. REs. LAWYER 475 (July 1970).
22. This summation of some of the difficulties encountered in a private
nuisance suit is only intended to be representative. There are other obstacles encountered by a plaintiff such as "coming-to-the-nuisance." In Riter v. Keokuk
Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 (1957) the court
stated:
[T]he right of a person to pure air may be surrendered in part by his
election to live in a city where the atmosphere is impregnated with smoke,
soot and other impurities. These statements are especially applicable to
one who elects to live in or adjacent to an industrial district.
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Today this common law private remedy is of little significance in pollution control. It has become increasingly clear that litigation by private
parties suing to protect their own special interest can not cope with the
problems created by large industrial and municipal complexes. Added to this
is the difficulty of pleading and proving a private nuisance case. Further,
litigation is expensive and many people will submit to living in a polluted
environment rather than bear the high cost of litigation.
B. Public Nuisance: Not Easily Transferable to Resource Problems
A public nuisance has been defined as "the doing of or the failure to
do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the
public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the
public." 23 This would seem to cover explicitly a situation where our water,
air, .and food are being poisoned, thus definitely endangering the health
and safety of the public. However, public nuisance has been historically
associated with abatement of brothels, gambling dens, and similar institutions, and the case law is therefore not easily transferable to natural resource
problems.2 4
There have been some cases dealing with bad odors, smoke, dust and
vibration, 25 obstructing navigable streams, 2 6 and even pollution of streams.2 7
However, the result of all these cases is that a private individual cannot
sue to enjoin a public nuisance. The suit ordinarily must be brought by
the state or federal attorney general in the name of the state or the people
of the state.2 8 Only in a few states have statutes expressly permitted indi29
viduals to sue to enjoin particular kinds of public nuisances.
However, nuisance law does recognize that the same act can create both

23. City of Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 83, 79 So. 476, 477 (1918); Commonwealth v. South Covington &C. St. R.R., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918).
24. State ex. rel. Williams v. Karston, 208 Ark. 705, 187 S.W.2d 327 (1945) ;
State ex rel. Leahy v. O'Rourke, 115 Mont. 502, 146 P.2d 168 (1944) (gambling
houses); Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 28 N.E. 514 (1891) (cases on house of
prostitution); Black v. Circuit Court of Eight Judicial Dist., 78 S.D. 302, 101
N.W.2d 520 (1960); State v. Navy, 123 W. Va. 722, 17 S.E.2d 626 (1941).
25. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1952); Soap Corp. of America v. Reynolds, 178 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1950); Wesson v.
Washburn Iron Co., 18 Allen 95, 90 Am. Dec. 181 (Mass. 1868): Potashnick Truck
Se-v. v. City of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173 S.W.2d 96 (1943).
26. Carver v. San Pedro, LA. & S.L.R.R., 151 F. 334 (C.C. Cal. 1906); Piscataqua Nay. Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 89 F. 362 (D.Mass. 1898); Willard
v. City of Cambridge, 3 Allen 574 (Mass. 1862).
27. State ex. rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas &cElec. Co., 204 S.W. 942 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1918).
28. See Attorney General v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W.
890 (1913); Columbia River Fisherman's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160
Or. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939); Goldsmith Sc Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534 (Trex.
Civ. App. 1942). Note that at common law a public nuisance was a crime comprehending a variety of petty offenses, all based on some interference with the comfort, convenience or health of the general public. For a further discussion see W.
PnossER, TORTS § 89, at 605 (3d ed. 1964).
29. Littleton v. Fritz 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641 (1885); Carleton v. Rugg, 149
Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55 (1889).
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private and public nuisance.3 0 For example, if pollution of a river destroys
the fish, such pollution would constitute a private nuisance where the river
flowed through private property, and a public nuisance in those areas where
the public right to fish was interfered with. So public nuisance can also
be a tort, giving rise to a private cause of action provided the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he has suffered some special or particular damages. However, proving these special damages is difficult because of the substantive
and procedural burden that the plaintiff is required to sustain.
A public nuisance action would offer the "possibility" of more effective
pollution control if state and federal officials will exercise their powers
to abate a nuisance. 3 ' This is because the state or municipality brings the
action, therefore reducing many of the major difficulties faced by private
litigants. However, public nuisance has historically been a catchall for petty
criminal offenses ranging from blocking a public byway to running
a house of prostitution. It has therefore been difficult to adapt public
nuisance theory to resource problems. Thus, public nuisance like private
nuisance remains an inadequate pollution control device. 32
C. Trespass
A few anti-pollution suits have employed the principle of trespass,
which is an unprivileged entry of a person or object on land possessed by
another. To establish trespass, one need only show an intentional, unprivileged entry onto the land, whereas to prove nuisance, a substantial and
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land must be
shown.3 3 Therefore in a trespass case, the plaintiff's burden of proof may
be less than in a nuisance case. This is because the plaintiff need not show
that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable or that substantial injury has
34
resulted.
The real disadvantage to recovering in pollution cases under a trespass
theory is the necessity of a "direct" physical entry by a person or "object."
In defining "object" some courts have held that entry of smoke, dust,
fumes or gas onto the plaintiff's land is not substantial enough to be a
trespass. 3 5 Also, some courts have held that if an intervening force, such
30. See Nolan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703 (1897); Bair v.
Central 9-So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1962).
31. For successful public nuisance actions in the pollution field, see: Platt
Bros. &Co. v. Waterberry, 80 Conn. 179, 67 A. 508 (1907); Dunlop Lake Property
Owners Ass'n. Inc. v. City of Edwardsville, 22 IlL App. 2d 95, 159 N.E.2d 4 (1959).
32. There are additional problems when a nuisance theory is followed. One
writer states:
Nuisance cases are virtually impossible to summarize or even categorize

since they differ so greatly from state to state as to the reasonability of the
defendant's conduct, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and the interre-

lationship with other remedies ....
Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for
Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLY L.

REv. 17, 25 (1966).

33.

EQurrY
34.
35.
Annot.,

rESTAT=MNT OF TORTS § 158 (1934); H. McCLiNTocK, HANDBOOK ON
§ 132, at 361-62 (1948).
Longennecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 267 P.2d 543 (1954).
See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942);
54 A.L.R.2d 764, 778 (1957).
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as wind or water, carries the contaminants onto the plaintiff's land, then
the entry is not "direct."3 6
In Lampert v. Reynolds Metal Co. 3 7 the United States District Court
of Oregon refused to engage in this elaborate distinction. The plaintiffs, who
raised agricultural crops, brought the action against the defendant for
money damages and injunctive relief for injuries caused by fluoride gases
emitted from the defendant's aluminum plant. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment for money damages, but held that
the district court, before granting an injunction against Reynolds, "should
weigh the apparent value to society of defendant's plant against the value
to society of plaintiff's farming activities."38 So in deciding this trespass case
the court engaged in a balancing-of-interests test similar to that involved
in nuisance cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.3 9
The difficulty of pinpointing which among many sources of pollution
in an area caused the injury to the plaintiff, the court's tendency to balance
equities, and the cost of litigation against huge corporations discourages the
filing of trespass suits. As with nuisance theory, trespass theory is inadequate
for effective pollution control on any major scale.
D. Riparian Rights and Water Pollution
The common law doctrine of riparian rights40 has traditionally governed the relationship between landowners abutting watercourses. The
riparian doctrine states that each proprietor of land abutting on a watercourse has a co-equal right to use water in that watercourse. Persons complaining of pollution of waters abutting their land have redress by a
lawsuit against the alleged polluter. This doctrine has been accepted in 31
American states, primarily east of the Mississippi, as the rule controlling the
41
rights to use of water in watercourses.
There are two separate concepts embodied in the riparian doctrine:
(1) the "natural flow" concept-the idea that each riparian as a right to
have the water in the watercourse come down to him unchanged in quantity
or quality, and (2) the "reasonable use" concept-the idea that each riparian
has an equal right to make reasonable use of the water even if alteration in
quantity or quality occur. 42 The particular interpretation of the riparian
doctrine followed in any particular state is determined by which of these
two concepts is emphasized by its courts. However, most states have adopted
a reasonable use interpretation of riparian rights. The reasonableness of
36. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 125 F. Supp. 481, 488 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
37. 372 F.2d 245 (1967).
38. Id. at 247. See also Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d
790 (1959).
39. 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dept. 1968).
40. The doctrine was judicially formulated in the case of Tyler v. Wilkinson,
4 Mason 397, 24 F. Cas. 472 (1827).
41. In the western states the rule of prior appropriation is followed. It is a
different concept from riparianism, being based on statute, and will not be discussed
in this article.
42. P. DAVIS, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR WATER QUALITY MANAGEIENT: A CASE
STUDY OF THE WISCONSIN WATER BASIN, Five Legal Studies on Water Quality Management in Wisconsin, Vol. VII § 1, at 8-10 (1970).
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each use will be measured by its relation to use made by others on the same
watercourse.
The question arises whether a riparian's rights under the majority
reasonable use concept includes the right to make reasonable uses of the
waters for waste disposal. A logical reading of the reasonable use concept
would seem to suggest that waste disposal should be permitted if reasonable
with respect to uses by other riparians. However, this would not be the
case if the natural flow idea was followed, because no alteration of the
stream's quality would be allowed. This minority natural flow position was
taken in City of Richmond v. Test 43 where the court stated:
The principle is well settled that in the absence of grant, license, or
prescription limiting his rights, a riparian proprietor has the right
to have the waters of a natural watercourse flow along or through
his premises
as it would naturally flow, without change of quantity
44
or quality.
In the past, however, the reasonable use concept has been chosen
over natural flow by a majority of the courts because it avoided the severe
limitations on economic and industrial growth implicit in natural flow.
The reasoning behind the reasonable use concept was explained in
45
Merrifield v. City of Worcester:
So the natural right.., to have the water descend to [a riparian]
in its pure state, fit to be used for various purposes to which he
may have occasion to apply it, must yield to the equal right in those
who happen to be above him. Their use of the stream for mill
purposes, for irrigation, watering cattle, and the manifold purposes
for which they may lawfully use it, will tend to render the water
more or less impure.... The water may thus be rendered unfit for
many uses for which it had before been suitable; but so far as
that condition results only from reasonable use of the stream in
accordance with
the common right, the lower riparian proprietor
46
has no remedy.
In determining reasonableness the courts and the jury may consider
many factors:
The decision of this question depend[s] not alone upon the extent
and nature of the impurities projected into the stream, but upon
the location of the plaintiff's land, the use to which it [is] devoted,
the effect upon it of any impurities in the stream, and the extent
to which pollution of the waters may [be] attributable to other
sources.... Surrounding circumstances such as the size and velocity
of the stream, the usage of the country, the extent of the injury, convenience of doing business, and indispensable public necessity of
cities and villages for drainage are taken into consideration.. .. 47
43. 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610 (1897).
44. 18 Ind. App. at 493, 48 N.E. at 614; see also H. B. Bowling Coal Co. v.
Ruffners, 117 Tenn. 180, 189-90, 100 S.W. 116, 119 (1906).
45. 110 Mass. 216 (1872).
46. Id. at 219.
47. See Reese v. City of Johnston, 45 Misc. 43, 44, 92 N.Y.S. 728, 729 (Sup. Ct.
1904), quoting Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 471, 60 N.E. 757, 760 (1901).
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Therefore, it seems clear from the above that reasonable use under riparian
rights requires a balancing of factors or conveniences in much the same
manner as the courts have done under the private nuisance and trespass
doctrines. The reasonable use concept carries with it a right of a riparian
to discharge wastes into a watercourse provided the discharge is not
unreasonable. 48
The courts in these cases have been concerned only with "economic
considerations" and have rejected such considerations as the natural beauty
of a watercourse, public health factors, and other general aesthetic considerations.4 9 In one case, the plaintiff brought an action claiming impairment of his riparian right to maintenance of the original beauty of
the river. The court rejected his contention, stating: "A riparian owner
has no proprietary right in a beautiful scene presented by a river any
more than any other owner of land could claim a right to a beautiful landscape."5 0 In another case, the New York court said: "In enjoining a
nuisance, there shall be not merely a sentimental, psychological, aesthetic,
or artistic complaint."51 In recent years, the attitude toward environmental
quality has been changing very rapidly and such applications of the riparian
doctrine as these are unlikely to fill the needs of a satisfactory legal doctrine to preserve the quality of a rapidly deteriorating environment.
E. Conclusion
The common law doctrines are concerned primarily with relationships
between individuals. They are not well suited to situations involving
diffused damages or rights of the public. The unsuitability of the common
law to protect the public interest has been recognized and administrative
regulation has been established in all states as an alternative to the common
law. In effect these administrative agencies represent the public. Their decisions on environmental questions are extensive in scope and likely to
seriously affect public interests. Yet, in many cases these agencies have been
criticized for not pursuing the good of the public as a whole. In such cases,
members of the public have sought to use our courts to challenge these
agency decisions. Instead of getting judicial review the public has been
met by various procedural requirements imposed by the courts. For the
environmentalists the most serious of these procedural burdens has been
the "standing" requirement.

48. See Donnelly Brick Co. v. City of New Britain, 106 Conn. 167, 175, 137 A.
745, 748 (1927); Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 578, 42 N.W. 448,
449 (1889); Dwinel v. Weazie, 44 Me. 167, 175 (1857).
49. See Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N. J. Super.
62, 76-82, 122 A.2d 233, 239-43 (1956); Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 48
Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1965); International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 892-93, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1944).
50. International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 892-93, 30 S.E.2d
537, 540 (1944).
51. Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606, 615
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
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A. Standing Requirement for JudicialReview
1. Introduction
For the environmentalist, the primary doctrine which has operated as a
limitation upon the availability of judicial review or judicial relief is "standing to sue." 52 Standing is used to determine whether a particular person is a
proper party to raise a particular issue. 3 Unless the person has a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy" 54 there is no standing to sue. The
question of a person's legal standing to apply for judicial relief in the courts
has nothing to do with the merits of his suit; it concerns the authority of
the court to entertain the action. Although standing is derived from no particular source, it is closely related to the limitations of Article III, Section 2,
of the United States Constitution which provides that the federal courts
must decide only "cases and controversies." 55 Thus, federal courts will not
adjudicate a dispute which presents only a political question, 56 seeks an
advisory opinion, 57 or is moot because of later developments. 58
2. Evolution of the Doctrine of Standing
The question of standing to seek judicial review of actions of regulatory agencies was first raised in Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v.
United States59 where the plaintiffs challenged a decision of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The court held that:
[P]laintiffs could not maintain this suit merely by showing (if
true) that the Commission was without power to order the penalty
charge cancelled. They must show also that the order alleged to be
52. United States ex. rel. Chapman v. F.P.C., 345 U.S. 153 (1953) ; Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), Standing to sue has been
called one of "the most amorphous (concepts) in the entire domain of public law."
Statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund, Hearings on S.2097 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 498
(1966); See Lewis, ConstitutionalRights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L.
Rxv. 433 (1962).
53. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
54. Id. at 101.
55. The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the "United States," and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens
of different States-between Citizens of the same state claiming Lands

under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
56. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1, 49 U.S. 1 (1849).
57. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911).
58. California v. San Pablo 9, T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
59. 263 U.S. 143 (1923); See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINIsTRATION
AcnoN (1965).
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void subjects them to legal action, actual or threatened. This they
have wholly failed to do.60
Also, in a 1937 decision, Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 61 the
Court held there was no standing for the plaintiff's action "unless the right
invaded is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 62 So despite illegal agency action the plaintiffs had no recourse. For them to have standing their interest had to be a special personal
interest threatened by the unlawful agency action and not an interest held
63
in common with all citizens.
3. A Turning Point in the Evolution of the Standing Requirement 4
The second phase in the evolution of the standing cases began in 1940
with the Supreme Court's decision in F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station.6 5 The question in Sanders was the standing of an existing broadcasting station, which would be economically injured by competition, to contest the Federal Commerce Commission's grant of a construction permit for
a new station. The Court held that Sanders' economic injury, although not
relevant in and of itself, afforded Sanders standing for the purpose of litigating the public interest. A significant enlargement and clarification of standing also occurred in Associated Industries v. Ickes66 where the Sanders
doctrine was reconciled with the constitutional requirement of a "case or
controversy." 67 Here it was held that the case or controversy requirement is
met if a citizen is considered as a "private Attorney General" acting to vindicate the public interest.
However, since Associated Industries the doctrine of standing has had
an uneven development and application. The courts have applied or ig60.
61.
62.
63.

263 U.S. at 148.
306 U.S. 118 (1937).
Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Stark v. Wickard,

321 U.S. 288 (1944), where the court stated:
It is only when a complainant possesses something more than a general interest in the proper execution of the laws that he is in a position to secure
judicial intervention. His interest must rise to the dignity of an interest
personal to him and not possessed by the people generally.
64. The previous discussion of standing and the discussion to follow deals
with standing to sue in the federal courts. Some state courts have created broader
definitions of standing at an earlier date (for example the Wisconsin courts). The
case of Muench v. Public Service Comm., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, rehearing.
261 Wis. 515, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952), involved an application by a private power
company to build a dam on the Namekagon River. The case arose upon an appeal
from the decision of the commission to permit the project. The commission had
made no findings on the effect that the proposed project would have on public
rights to hunting, fishing, and scenic beauty. Muench, the plaintiff, had standing
in the Wisconsin court because as a member of the public he had a legal right to
use the state's waters.
65. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
66. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See also
Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942); F.C.C. v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S.
239 (1943).
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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nored the requirement as they have seen fit in a particular case.68 The presence or absence of standing has been a result oriented conclusion which the
court marshalls to explain why it sustained or dismissed the complaint.
B. A Recent Redefinition of the Standing Requirement
At a recent conference on law and the environment it was stated that
[tjhe first, and perhaps the greatest hurdle in a suit with the
federal government is the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Because the government puts so much of its litigation effort into
such motions, he who defeats one may consider himself to have won
a major victory. In fact, establishing the right of the citizen to sue to
protect the environment by defeating such motions is the first
priority. Precedents in the field are trophies to be sought after. 9
The 1966 decision of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C.70
is a significant case and the starting point for any environmentalist's search
for precedents in order to meet the standing requirement.
In Scenic Hudson the Federal Power Commissioh licensed the Consolidated Edison Company of New York to construct a hydroelectric project
on the Hudson River in an "area of unique beauty and major historical significance." 71 The action was brought by two towns and a conservation group
seeking a reversal of the licensing order on the grounds the Commission had
failed to properly weigh environmental factors. The court agreed with the
complainants that the Commission's licensing practices must include "a
basic concern for the preservation of natural beauty and national historic
shrines." 72 More significantly, the court held that because of the plaintiffs'
interest in the area they had standing in order "to insure that the Federal
Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development."7 3
In Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd,74 a civic organization of Bedford, New York residents challenged the determination of the
Federal Highway Administrator on his approval of a route for a portion of
interstate highway which failed to take into account factors such as planning
and conservation. The court concluded that
these provisions are sufficient under the principle of Scenic Hudson
to manifest a congressional intent that towns, local civic organizations, and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved' by
agency action which allegedly has disregarded their interest.75
68. Good examples of this technique are United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), where the Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction depended
on standing to seek review, and Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
345 U.S. 128 (1953), where the Court ignored the standing requirement because
the issue was not raised before the Court.
69. Moorman, Outline for the PracticingEnvironmental Lawyer 2, presented
to the Conference on Law and the Environment, Sept. 11-12, 1969, in Warrenton,
Virginia.
70. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id. at 624.
73. Id. at 616.
74. 270, F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
75. Id. at 661.
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Scenic Hudson and Road Review League do not solve all the problems of
standing because the plaintiffs in those cases were from the areas where the
proposed projects were to be located, and it could be argued that they had a
special personal interest over and above their interest as environmentalists.
However, in Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,76
the Sierra Club, a national conservation organization with chapters throughout the United States, was held to have standing in a suit to enjoin the
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of the Corps of Engineers, and the Secretary
of Transportation from issuing permits for the construction of causeways
and dikes along the Hudson River. There was standing despite the fact that
the conservation group had "no personal economic claim to assert." 77 Citing
Scenic Hudson and Road Review League, the court concluded:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with protection of natural, historic, and
scenic resources then a congressional intent exists to give standing
to groups interested in these factors and who allege that
these factors are not being properly considered by the agency."8
Scenic Hudson, Road Review League, Citizens Committee, and dozens
of other state and federal cases7 9 have laid down the principle that "groups
interested in conservation" have standing to act as a watchdog for protection
of the environment without the necessity of a personal legal right or
economic interest being threatened.8 0 A person or group no longer needs
a direct stake in an environmental issue in order to go to court. The new
test of standing for environmentalists is only that a natural resource be
threatened and that the plaintiff be a responsible person or organization
sincerely interested in the preservation of that natural resource.
C. The Increased Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions:
Recent Supreme Court Clarification
Added to the significant relaxation of the standing requirement is the
fact that judicial review of agency actions is now more readily available than
ever before. Historically it has been the pratice of the courts to allow administrators to formulate substantive agency policy within the broad statutory guidelines, and judicial review of such agency actions was obtainable only if the actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
81
otherwise not in accordance with law."
In a 1967 decision, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,2 the Supreme
76. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

77. Id. at 1092.
78. Id. (emphasis added).

79. See note 2 supra. See generally Tarlock and Tippy, The Wild and Scenic

River Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 707 (1970); Yannacone, Plaintiff's Brief in
Project Rulison Case, 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 761 (1970).
80. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970), where the Court outlined the interests sufficient to give a
plaintiff standing to sue.
81. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (Supp. IV, 1969).
82. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). For a discussion of this case see Sax, Public Rights in
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Court held that the courts should restrict access to judicial review "only
upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative
intent... ."83 and added further that the "[P]rocedure Act's generous review provision must be given a 'hospitable' interpretation."8 4 Such cases as
Cappadora v. Celebrezze,8 5 Road Review League, and Citizens Committee
have added to Abbott to the point that now there is a "presumption" of
a court's jurisdiction under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act; a
presumption that can only be overcome by a clear showing that Congress did
not intend judicial review.
Further, on March 3, 1970, in the cases of Association of Data Processing
Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp8 6 and Barlow v. CollinsS7 the Court
handed down significant precedents dealing with public control over a
regulatory agency and challenges to the validity of that agency's actions. The
Court in these cases made judicial review available to all persons who are
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."8 8 Therefore, these agencies
that make important decisions concerning our environment, and whose
governing statutes contain no provision for review will now have their action subject to review by persons interested in preserving the environment.
Also, the Court, in a clarification of the Abbott decision, made it plain
that these provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of review by
stating:
Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargment of
the class of people who can protest administrative action. The
whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved 'persons' is
symptomatic of that trend ....89
And in Barlow v. Collins the Court added:
It is... only upon a showing of dear and convincing evidence of
a contrary legislative intent that the courts should restrict access to
judicial review.90
With this broadened concept of standing these agencies find their
actions being challenged in numerous suits brought by conservation groups,
recreation groups, and just plain concerned citizens. It would appear that
the federal and state agencies' legal shelter, standing, is now coming to an
end. Instead, these agencies will constantly be engaged in litigation over
those decisions which affect our environment.

versity of Texas Law School Water Law Conference: Contemporary Developments
in Water Law (C. Johnson & S. Lewis ed. 1970).
83. 387 U.S. at 141 (1967).
84. Id.
85. 356 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966).
86. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
87. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
88. Id. at 168.
89. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970).
90. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

15

1971]

COMMENT
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 8
D. Conclusion

Private citizens are no longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative agencies to protect the public interest and have begun to take
the initiative themselves. The result has been a proliferation of lawsuits
which present a diversity of legal theories that range from mere assertions
that an administrator committed a procedural error to constitutional claims
to a decent environmeit. The remainder of this article will be an attempt
to present some of these new theories for creating substantive rights in
environmental quality.
IV. PUBLIC TRUST DOCRINE
A. Introduction
One of the new substantive approaches for bringing the public interest
to the attention of the courts has been suggested by Joseph Sax in an excellent article explaining the "public trust doctrine." 91 The concept of public
trust law considers land such as rivers, seashores, parkland (i.e., any public
land) as held in trust for the benefit of the public. The public trust doctrine,
as advanced by Sax, seeks to develop a comprehensive legal approach to
resource management by meeting three necessary criteria: 1) the concept of a
legally enforceable right in the public; 2) enforceability against the government; 3) an interpretation consistent with present concerns for environmental quality.
The source of the public trust doctrine originated with the Roman and
English concept that the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of their rights of navigation, fishing, use of running water and
use of the highways. Historically, the concept as developed in the United
States included public land below the low water mark of the oceans and
great lakes and the water within the rivers. Also included were park and
forest lands, especially if donated by a private person for "public use only."
B. Public Trust Doctrine As Applied to Resource Management
In the area of public resources the interests of the majority are in
many cases subjugated to the will of well financed minority interests. Certain
interest groups such as utility companies, large industrial interests and
certain government agencies have clear and immediate goals that they
seek to accomplish. In many cases these powerful minority interests have
an undue influence on resource decisions made by legislative and administrative bodies. Further, administrative agencies and their bureaucracies are frequently insulated from their particular constituencies. It is
in this situation that the public trust lands are likely to be put in jeopardy.
The classic example in American law where the concept of public trust
was applied to remedy a grievious injury to the public interest was the
Supreme Court decision in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.9 2 In 1869, the
91. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. Rxv. 473 (1970). Much of the explanation of the
public trust doctrine in this comment is from the Sax article which has an extended
discussion of the concept.
92. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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Illinois legislature made an extensive grant of land to the Illinois Central
Railroad including all the land underlying Lake Michigan for one mile
out from the shoreline and extending one mile in length along the business
district of Chicago.9 3 By 1873 the legislature, realizing what it had done,
sought to repeal the grant. The Supreme Court upheld the repeal holding
that such a conveyance of trust land was beyond the power of the state
legislature. The Court stated that the state's title to navigable waters of
Lake Michigan is
[D]ifferent in character from that which the state holds in lands
intended for sale.... It is a title held in trust for the people of the
state that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
freed from
94
the obstruction or interference of private parties.
In general, governments exist to provide broad public services to all
their citizens such as schools, police protection, parks and other similar
services. When a government takes governmental resources and uses them to

benefit small groups, the court's suspicions should be aroused. The Massachusetts courts have taken this principle and developed a rule that a change
in the use of public lands is not permissible without a clear showing of
legislative approval. In Gould v. Greylack Reservation Commission,95
Mount Greylack, a mountain surrounded by natural forest, was under the
control of a Massachusetts state agency, Greylack Reservation Commission,
which acted as a park commission. This commission leased 4,000 acres of the
reservation to an organization called Tramway Authority for the development of an elaborate ski operation. The plaintiffs, five citizens of the
county in which the reservation was located, brought the suit as beneficiaries of the public trust under which the reservation was held. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held both the lease and management agreement invalid on the ground that they were in excess of the statutory grant of authority creating the commission. 96 The court questioned
why a state should subordinate a public park to the demands of private
investors for such a commercial facility. The court devised a presumption
that a state does not ordinarily intend to divert public trust property in
such a manner as to lessen the public uses. Under the Massachusetts rule
this presumption will guide resource management cases unless the legislature
clearly indicates a desire that a particular resource be handled otherwise.
In a situation where the public trust is endangered the court will send the
case back for express legislative authority.
93. This grant comprised virtually the whole commercial waterfront of Chicago
and was of incalculable value.
94. 146 U.S. at 452.
95. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
96. The court in Gould v. Greylack Reservation Commission stated:
The profit sharing feature and some aspects of the project itself strongly
suggest a commercial enterprise. In addition to the absence of any clear
or express statutory authorization of as broad a delegation of responsibility
by the Authority as is given by the management agreement, we find no
express grant to the Authority of power to permit use of public lands and
of the Authority's borrowed funds for what seems, in part at least, a commercial venture for private profit. 350 Mass. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
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Sax has stated "the function which the courts must perform, and have
been performing is to promote equality of political power for a disorganized
and diffuse majority by remanding appropriate cases to the legislature after
public opinion has been aroused."97 In a dispute between advocates of a
park and those wanting to take the parkland for a highway, the courts' task
would be to make sure that one interest is not underpresented in the political
process. Once both sides were adequately represented, the court would withdraw leaving the final result to the democratic process.
Also, any resource decisions made by a county or municipal agency
which are of statewide interest will have to be approved by a state agency
or the state legislature. Courts will chose an entity, be it local, state-wide or
federal, that insures representation of all significant interests. In other
words, the fundamental function of the courts in the public trust area will
be one of "democratization." The courts will rectify political imbalances
that exist where certain interests have difficulty in organizing to oppose
certain legislative and administrative resource decisions.
What criterion will the court use in a particular case to determine
whether a particular resource decision has been improperly handled at
the administrative or legislative level? Sax proposes four guidelines that the
court can use:
1) Has the public property been disposed of at less than market value
under circumstances which indicate no obvious reason for the grant of a
subsidy? As an example, if the land is being given away to a developer
of luxury apartments then a court can reexamine the transaction.
2) Has the government given a private interest authority to make
resource-use decisions which subordinate important public resource uses to
that private interest?
3) Has there been an attempt to reallocate public uses either to private
uses or public uses which have less breadth? For example, an attempt to
convert a public park into a little-used or needed ski area or a decision to
close a local beach and use it for garbage disposal or highway development
would fit into this category.
4) Whether the resource is being used for its natural purpose, e.g.,
whether a lake is being used "as a lake." Generally, a natural resource has
its broadest and most beneficial use when left in its natural state. A lake
contains fishing, swimming, boating, scenic beauty and wildlife. To fill the
lake in and build luxury apartments would benefit only a small minority
of citizens.98

97. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 473, 560 (1970).
98. Some environmentalists consider not only public land, but private land as
held in trust for the public benefit. Land and natural resources are not something
that can be taken and squandered for the gathering of private fortunes. Instead,
they are something that belong to each of us as trustees for future generations, to
be used wisely by whomever might hold them at the particular time.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss1/8
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A. Ninth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments Approach
In EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.9 9 the plain-

tiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the constitutional ground
that continued emission of noxious sulphur compounds by the defendant
violated the rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed under the ninth amendment
of the Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The case has not been decided by
the Montana court; however, the "constitutional right" argument runs
something like this: The right to a pollution free environment is one of the
fundamental unenumerated rights guaranteed by the ninth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, 100 which says:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people
and protected under the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States:' 01
nor shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of the law....
and made applicable to the states under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States:
no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.1 02
This "constitutional rights" argument may find a substantial precedent
in the Warren Court's decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.0 3 In that case
an officer of the Planned Parenthood League and a licensed physician were
convicted of violating Connecticut statutes making it a crime to teach
birth control techniques even to married couples. It appeared that there
was little the Court could do because the right to birth control information
was guaranteed nowhere in the Bill of Rights. Yet the Court, with Justice
Douglas writing for the majority, struck down this Connecticut statute
which attempted to regulate morals. The Court stated that each of the
specific rights listed in the Bill of Rights has "penumbras... that help give
99. Civil No. 1694 (D. Mont., filed Nov. 13, 1968); see also, National Audubon Soc'y. v. Resor, No. 67-271, CIV-TC (S.D. Fla., filed March 15, 1967).
100. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For further discussion of this Constitutional right

argument, see Victor Yannacone, Sue The Bastards, speech delivered on "Earth
Day" at Michigan State University, April 22, 1970.
108. 881 U.S. 479 (1965).
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them life and substance."'104 The Court found a right of privacy in the Bill
of Rights which the Connecticut legislature could not invade. 10 5
Reasoning from Griswold, there must surely be a right to an environment fit for human habitation. If the poisoning of the environment continues we will surely be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.... ."106 Further, the listing of specific rights "shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,"' 0 7 such
as freedom to live in a decent environment.
Even if the courts are presently not willing to accept such a doctrine,
they may be persuaded to accept the more limited assertion that the public
has a constitutional right to procedural due process in such cases.10 s In
essence, the claim would be that the public has a sufficient interest in public
resource allocation decisions, that it is entitled to notice and access to data;
in other words some sort of administrative due process. 1 09
B. Constitutional Amendments
Because of the ease with which statutory protection of the environment can be evaded, and the difficulties of traditional legal theories, some
legislators have proposed that only an amendment to the Constitution,
guaranteeing each citizen a wholesome environment, can overcome these
inadequacies."10 By declaring a clean environment to be a national policy,
much of the indecision that exists in our courts and administrative control
agencies would be rectified. The courts and federal agencies would have
the guidelines they need in the form of a constitutional mandate to clean
up the environment.
In fact, some states have introduced amendments to their constitutions
seeking to establish the right to a dean environment. Typical of these is
the Pennsylvania Constitutional Amendment:
That article one of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania be amended by adding at the end thereof, a new
section to read:
104. 381 U.S. at 484; see Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment;E=MC2:
Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 674, 690-91 (1970).
105. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), finding a"right of association"
in the Bill of Rights.
106. U.S. CONsTr. amend. V & amend. XIV.
107. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
108. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective

Judicial Intervention, 68 Micu. L. Rlv. 473, 476 (1970).
109. Just such a theory was advanced in Weingand v. Hickel, No. 69-1317 EC
(C.D. Cal., filed July 10, 1969), where an action was brought to enjoin the Secretary
of the Interior from approving oil operations of federal lessees in the Santa Barbara
Channel "without first according.., to members of the public.., a full and fair
hearing, after adequate notice, and without, prior thereto, according the ... public
access to data upon which ...recommendations were based .... Complaint para.
XVI, at 11.
110. Richard L. Ottinger, United States Representative from New York, was
among a group of legislators who proposed such an amendment. H. R. Res. 1321,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See Ottinger, Legislation and The Environment: Individual Rights and Government Accountability, 55 Commu.
L. REv. 666, 671-72
(1970).
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Section 27. Natural Resources and Public Estate.-The people
have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's natural resources, including the air, waters, fish,
wildlife, and the public lands and property of the Commonwealth,
are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonvealth shall
preserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people."'
VI.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

A legal device likely to be put increasingly to use by conservationists is
the writ of mandamus, a court order to a person or officer, usually a public
official, requiring the performance of a particular duty which results from
the official station of the party. 112 Administrative mandamus can be used
by citizens and conservation groups to get judicial review of actions of
administrative agencies which have the power of judge, jury, and executioner of our natural resources. Therefore, mandamus type relief is likely
to be sought against government agencies that fail to take environmental
factors into account when placing highways and dams or authorizing pipelines, powerlines and power plant construction.
Rule 81 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "The
writs of... mandamus are hereby abolished. Relief heretofore available by
mandamus ... may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate
motion under the practice prescribed in these rules." So Rule 81 (b), while
abolishing the writ of mandamus, preserves the "relief heretofore available
by mandamus." Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
a clarification of Rule 81 (b), held "that the remedy which before adoption
of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was known as mandamus, is
available under the new rules and is governed by the same principles as
formerly governed its administration." 118
Generally, courts have used administrative mandamus to review quasijudicial actions such as suspensions or revocations of existing rights. The
tendency of the courts has been to imply the requirement of a hearing and
notice whenever the administrative agencies were engaging in what was in
effect an adjudication of a complainant's rights. By the use of a writ of
the administrative agencies do
mandamus the courts would require that
4
their duty toward the affected parties."

111. Pa. H.R. 958 (1969). See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment;
E=MC2: Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 674, 686-87 (1970).
112. See 34 Am. Jon. Mandamus § 2 (1941); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 1 (1948);
AD1mInsTRAE LAW §§ 24.02-24.07 (1958); Netterville, Administrative
"Questions of Law" and the Scope of Judicial Review in California, 29 S. CAL. L.
RIv. 434 (1956); Kleps, Certiorar'fiedMandamus Reviewed: The Courts and California Administrative Decisions-1949-1959, 12 STAN. L. Rv. 554 (1960).

K. DAvis,

113. Hammond v. Hull, 131 F.2d 23, 25 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 (1942).

114. See 25i IowA L. Rv. 638 (1940); 27 IowA L. Rrv. 291 (1942); Kleps, CertiorarifiedMandamus Reviewed: The Courts and CaliforniaAdministrative Decisions
-1949-1959, 12 STAN. L. REv. 554 (1960).
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The orthodox statement of the mandamus doctrine was made in
5
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie:11
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use. It also is employed to
compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way ...116
The law in the past has rested upon this "ministerial--discretionary"" 7
distinction. If the administrative action involved an exercise of administrative judgment or discretion on an uncertain question, then the courts could
not interfere with this judgment because it was discretionary. However,
where an interpretation was clear from the authorizing statute, and the
administrative agency was acting erroneously, then the courts could compel
the agency to do its duty.
In the past it has been possible for an administrative agency to contend
that the consideration and weighing of environmental factors was discretionary and therefore the courts could not exercise judicial review over
its resource decisions. However, in 1969 the groundwork was laid and
the principle codified for requiring administrative agencies to give serious
considerations to our environment. Congress passed the National Environment Policy Act of 1969118 which requires all federal agencies to consider
environmental factors. The stated congressional purposes of the Act are:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the nation; and to establish a Council of
Environmental Quality.i" 9
More importantly from the private litigant's point of view, the Act
attempts to enforce this stated purpose by requiring that "to the fullest
extent possible" federal laws and administrative policies shall be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the Act. 120 Specifically, federal legislation and
actions of federal administrative agencies must include a statement on (1)
the impact on man's environment of the proposal, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided, (3) alternatives to the proposed
action, (4) the relationship between short term uses of the environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any
115. 281 U.S. 206 (1930).
116. Id. at 218.

117. See State ex. rel. South St. Paul v. Hetherington, 240 Minn. 298, 301, 61

N.W.2d 737, 740 (1953) "[M]andamus ...does lie to set the exercise of that discretion into motion where the board fails to act or obtain a new bona fide exercise
of discretion when it appears that the board has acted without discretion or in a
clearly arbitrary and capricious manner."
118. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1970).
119. Id. § 4321.
120. Id. § 4331 (b) (6).
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irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
12
involved in the proposed action. '
A full consideration of environmental factors by administrative agencies
is now a congressional mandate. A private citizen concerned about the
effects of an agency action should be able to go into court and pray for
judicial review of this action by contending non-compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act. The court, using mandamus or mandatory type relief, can then compel the agency and its officers to perform
their "statutory duty" toward the environment.
VII. OTHER THEORIES: CLAss AcTiONs, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, AND
Qui TAm AcTiONS
A. Class Actions
The class action
has provided a device so that mere numbers will
not disable large groups of individuals with united interests from enforcing
their rights. By Rule 23 the Supreme Court has extended the use of the class
action device to the entire field of federal civil litigation by making it
applicable to all civil actions. 123 It provides a means by which a large group
of persons who are interested in a matter, such as pollution, may sue or be
sued as representatives of the class without needing to join every member of
the class. There are only two general requirements for the maintenance of a
class action:1 24 (1) that the persons constituting the class must be so
numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the court, and
(2) the named representatives must be such as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of them all.
Only one pollution case has been brought as a formal class action. That
was the case of Storley v. Armour & Co. 1 2 5 where 56 riparian plaintiffs
(representing 70 downstream farms) brought a class action against a
slaughterhouse for polluting a river. Damages were awarded by the district
court. However, Storley is a class action only in the sense that one action was
substituted for 32 separate actions, and is not a class action in the same
sense as a stockholder's derivative suit. Further, the case does not state the
conditions under which a class action for pollution abatement may be
brought and the case does not define how substantial a plaintiff's interest
must be before he can act as a representative of a class. In addition, a recent
22

Supreme Court case 126 interprets the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to

require that each member of a class in a federal diversity case must meet the
jurisdictional requirements. The Storley case provides only a foot-in-thedoor. A clearcut decision in the pollution class action field is still lacking.
121. Id. § 4323.
122. 2 BAreoN AN HoLTzoFF (Wright ed.) §§ 561-63, 567-72; Symposium, Federal Rule 23-The Class Action, 10 B.C. IND. &CoM. L. REv. 497 (1969).
123. Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
124. Donelon, Prerequisitesto a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. LND.
. CoAr. L. R-v. 527 (1969).
125. 107 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1939).
126. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), holding that the aggregate claims of
the members of the class will not satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement.
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B. Declaratory Judgments
The most important non-statutory form of proceeding for review of an
administrative action in the federal courts has been the declaratory judgment
followed by an injunction. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,.., any court
of the United States..., upon the filing of an appropriate pleadrelations of any
ing, may declare the rights and other legal
2
7
interested party seeking such declaration ....
Unless a statute makes some other form of proceeding exclusive, federal
administrative action is reviewable by a proceeding for an injunction or
for a declaratory judgment or both. Declaratory judgments are also the
customary means of review of state administrative actions in the federal
courts.

12 8

At the state level thirty-five states have adopted the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act which provides that:
Any person... whose rights ... are affected by a statute... may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the statute.., and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder.
Declaratory relief may be appropriate to obtain a determination whether
an administrative agency action is valid or whether that agency has sufficiently weighed environmental factors. Or an individual may seek a court
declaration that a particular industry or individual is creating a nuisance,
has committed a trespass, or has failed to meet federal or state pollution
standards.
As public concern for the environment grows, state legislatures have
begun to respond to pressure for public participation. Recently, Michigan
enacted an environmental protection act which stated its purpose as: "An
act to provide for declaratory and equitable relief for protection of air, water
and other natural resources and the public trust therein. . . ." The
act further provides that "The attorney general, any political subdivision
of the state, . . . any person, partnership, corporation... may maintain an
action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur....29
C. Qui Tam Actions under the Rivers and HarborsAct of 1899
(Refuse Act of 1899)i30
The 1899 Refuse Act is a powerful, but little used, weapon in the
federal arsenal of water pollution control legislation. Section 13 of the
127. 62 Stat. 964 (1948), amended, 63 Stat. 964 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1948).
128. K. DAVIs, ADmIsIsra TrE LAW TEXT § 2804 (1959).
129. Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of
1970, M.C.L.A. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1970) (emphasis added).
130. See "Our Waters and Wetlands". How the Corps of Engineers Can Help
Prevent Destruction and Pollution" H. R. REP. No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
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Act""' prohibits anyone, including any individual, corporation, municipality, or group from throwing, discharging, or depositing any "refuse"
matter of any kind into the nation's navigable lakes, rivers, streams, or any
tributary to such waters. The term refuse has been broadly defined by the
Supreme Court to include all foreign substances and pollutants. 3 2 It
includes solids, oils, chemicals, and other liquid pollutants. In addition, the
section prohibits anyone, without a Corps of Engineers permit, from placing
on the bank of navigable waterways any material that could be washed into
the waterway.
Violations of the Refuse Act are subject to criminal prosecution and
penalties of not more than $2,500 nor less than $500 for each day or instance
of violation, or imprisonment for not less than 30 days nor more than I year,
or both fine and imprisonmenL. 3 The Refuse Act of 1899 also provides that
"one-half of [the] fine [imposed for violation of the Act is] to be paid to
the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.' t a
The issue is whether Congress by the use of this language has allowed
citizens the right to bring qui tam actions to enforce the Refuse Act. The
Act does not explicitly state that citizens have a right to sue the polluter
directly. But it does not explicitly deny this right to citizens.
However, there are several American cases which support the proposition that where a statute providing for a reward to informers does not specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute a qui tam action,
such a statute is to be construed to authorize such a suit. 3 5 Further, the likelihood that the Refuse Act will be given a liberal interpretation has been
greatly increased by the passage in the last few years of many statutes and the
issuance of executive orders designed to minimize pollution, maximize
recreation, and preserve natural resources.186 The Refuse Act can be used
as a broad grant of authority and a powerful legal tool for preventing the
pollution of all navigable waters.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Environmental degradation has been a way of life in this country. Our
whole economy has been premised on the freedom of public and private
enterprises to release pollutants and to destroy natural resources. In the
past we have been motivated only by short-term economic considerations
131. 33 U.S.C. 407 (1899).
132. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 862 U.S. 482, 490 (1960).
133. 33 U.S.C. 411 (1899).
134. Id.
135. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942) ; Adams, qui
tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805); United States v. Loescki, 29 F. 699,
(N.D. Ill.,
1887); United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857 (D. Mont., 1898): Chicago and
Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 IM.414 (1865).
136. Some of these statutes and orders are:
Federal Water Power Act of 1920 as amended (16 U.S.C. 701, et seq.);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 466, et seq.) as amended by
Water Quality Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-234, 79 Stat. 903);
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246);
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-224, 84 Stat. 91).
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and have dumped wastes into rivers, discharged fumes into the air and
stripped the earth of its minerals. Yet recently, many concerned citizens
have realized that if we continue to act as an irresponsible lord and master
over our environment we are headed for extinction. They have begun to
realize the true social costs of continuing to exploit our environment.
The legislative and executive branches of our government have been
excessively slow in enacting environmental legislation and have been almost
paralyzed when it comes time for using what powers they already possess.
This phenomenon has been due in many cases to the nature of our political
system. Powerful economic interests exert significiant influence on our
legislators and the agency bureaucrats that control resource allocation
decisions in our environment. James Nathan Miller, in Rape on the
Oklawaha, writing about an attempt to stop the United States Army Corps
of Engineers from constructing a barge canal over the Oklawaha River in
Florida, put it in these terms:
Thus the tragic irony: while there is probably no issue which the
American people are more united than the need to preserve their
environment, there is no fight they are losing faster. The reason:
distribution of forces. On one side are the huge number of conservationists, split up into localized fractionalized units, working in
their spare time, with their own money, mainly in their own communities. On the other side are the developers-well paid businessmen and bureaucrats, tightly organized in trade associations and
lobby groups whose influence extends statewide or even nationwide. In the Oklawaha battle, for instance, while there wasn't a
single conservation lobbyist in the state capitol at Tallahassee, there
were at least 50 lobbyists for pro-canal interests. It's a case of a horde
of unarmed amateurs fighting a few professionals who are equipped
with the latest weapons.' 3'
So what can the private citizen do? The courts offer the possibility of
a fair and impartial forum to remedy environmental wrongs. The courts
are not subjected to the same political and economic pressures that legislative and administrative branches of government are subjected. The
judiciary system which provides that each side may present evidence, call
experts, and cross-examine presents the best opportunity for a wise and
reasoned resource allocation decision. In addition, the courts in the fifties
and sixties have begun more and more, to hand down decisions in the
areas of social legislation that meet the needs of our rapidly changing society.
Recently, the courts have restructured the whole system in such areas as
due process, 13 8 reapportionment, 139 and civil rights.140 The courts have
broken new ground in areas where the other branches of government had
lagged and refused to act.
137. Miller, Rape of the Olkawaha, 96 READ. DIGrsr 54-60 (Jan. 1970).
138. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1959); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
139. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
140. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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However, the passive nature of the courts and the procedural difficulties of maintaining an action are significant obstacles to the use of the
judiciary as a means of stopping the degradation of our environment. Courts
can not initiate actions; these actions must be brought by private citizens.
These concerned citizens are relatively unorganized and are often localized
environmentalists; they may be unwilling or unable to bear the expense
and trouble of litigation. In addition, private citizens are usually unaware
or unaroused until after irreparable injury takes place or harmful construction begins. Further, the private litigant never knows when the court will
parade out such theories as contributory fault, assumption of risk, coming
to the nuisance, balancing equities or standing. Therefore, aside from the
actual environmental suits themselves, another function of our courts in
this fight to save our environment may be as a forum for environmentalists
to focus the attention of our legislators on the basic issue of human existence.
PATRMCK
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